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Implementation of Basel II: Any Role for
International Financial Institutions?
C. E. Nwandikom, PhD*

I.

Introduction

T

he New Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II) proposes a significant
refinement of regulatory and supervisory practice and encourages
increased attention to risk management practices in supervisory
agencies and financial institutions and improved disclosure and market
discipline. Basel II was made necessary and inevitable by the evolution of the
banking sector following the introduction of Basel I, particularly the growth of
internationally-active banks and improvements in their risk management
practices.

In all countries, a strong financial sector infrastructure including effective riskbased banking supervision, is critical for financial stability and development and
is a necessary precondition for implementation of the Pillar 1 capital
requirements of Basel II. Safe and sound banking are key to financial stability
which in tum facilitates economic development.

While much of the debate on Basel II has centered on the complexity and
resource requirements of the advanced approaches to minimum capital
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requirements under Pillar 1, countries may benefit more, in the medium term,
from implementation of Pillars 2 and 3, addressing supervisory practices and
expanded market discipline and disclosure.
A good number of countries have expressed an interest in adopting Basel II for
their banking systems. This interest of countries to implement Basel II may be
leveraged to upgrade the quality of their banking supervision through better
compliance with the Basel Core Principles (BCPs) and an increased focus on
risk-based banking supervision and market discipline. International financial
organisations (ITOs) should be ready to provide assistance to achieve this.
Adoption of Basel II by member countries will affect the surveillance, technical
assistance (TA) and financial sector development agenda ofITOs. Surveillance of
banking supervisory systems may become more complex in countries that have
implemented Basel II, and cross-country comparisons will become more
difficult, as countries choose different implementation options.

Meeting demands for Basel II-oriented financial sector surveillance and
provision of Basel II-related technical assistance to member countries of
ITOs will require:
• Building of expertise within the institutions and greater reliance on
cooperating supervisory agencies to provide Basel II experts;
•
•

A focus on strengthening baseline supervisory infrastructure and systems;
and
Managing member country expectations and setting limits to what the IFOs
can deliver, in particular with regard to building quantitative risk
management models for implementation of the more advanced Basel II
capital adequacy approaches.

The turmoil in financial markets that resulted from the 2007 subprime mortgage
crisis in the United States indicates the need to drastically transform regulation
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and supervision of financial institutions. Would these institutions have been
sounder if the 2004 Revised Framework on International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards (Basel II Accord)negotiated between 1999
and 2004had already been fully implemented? Basel II represents a change in
capital regulation of large banks in the countries represented on the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision: Its internal ratingsbased approaches to
capital regulation will allow large banks to use their own credit risk models to set
minimum capital requirements.
The Basel Committee itself implicitly acknowledged in spring 2008 that the
revised framework would not have been adequate to contain the risks exposed by
the subprime crisis and needed strengthening.
Basel II may lead to far-reaching changes in the regulation and supervision of
banks, risk management and other aspects of banking practice; these changes may
well be considered as one of the most important elements of the global financial
system Basel II may prove a source of macroeconomic risks in many emergingmarket countries owing to changes following its adoption in lender-borrower
relations and in the way in which banks are supervised. It incorporates the
fundamental assumption that the relationship between a bank and its
counterparties is conducted at arms-length. A different model of borrower-lender
relations in many emerging-market countries, especially in parts of Asia, has
involved practices such as policy or directed lending, relationship or name
lending and collateral-based lending. In this model, loans are made on the basis of
criteria different from those underlying Basel II and often resemble equity
investments. Too rapid a change to the new model of banking practice of Basel II
would alter an economy's credit mechanism and could have adverse knock-on
macroeconomic consequences ifthe fundamentals are not well anchored.
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11.0 Rationale, Elements and Benefits ofBasel II
11.1 Rationale

There is strong belief that prudent and risk-sensitive regulatory capital
requirements are integral to ensuring that individual banks and the financial
system have an adequate cushion against losses, particularly during times of
financial or economic stress.
First, although Basel I was a major step forward in capital risk sensitivity at the
time, rapid and extensive evolution in the financial marketplace has substantially
reduced the effectiveness. The current Basel I regulatory capital rules are
increasingly inadequate for large, internationally-active banks that offer ever
more complex and sophisticated products and services in a competitive
environment.
The flaws of the existing Basel I rule for large, complex banks are fairly wellknown. The simple risk-bucketing approach, for example, creates perverse
incentives for risk-taking. This approach--in which (1) the same amount of
regulatory capital is assessed against all unsecured corporate loans and bonds
regardless of actual risk, (2) all unsecured consumer credit card exposures are
treated equivalently, and (3) almost all first-lien residential mortgage exposures
are deemed equally risky--provides incentives for banking organizations to shed
relatively low-risk exposures and acquire relatively high-risk exposures within
each of these asset classes. The existing Basel I rule also ignores important
elements of credit-risk mitigation--such as most forms of collateral, many
guarantees and credit derivatives, and the maturity and seniority of an
exposureand, thus, blunts bank incentives to reduce or otherwise manage risk.
Moreover, Basel I is particularly inadequate for dealing with capital markets
transactions, such as repurchase agreements, securities borrowing and lending,
margin loans, and over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives. For example, it only

r
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imposes capital requirements on one side of a repurchase agreement, even though
counterparty credit risk is present on both sides. For these reasons, a large and
complex bank operating under Basel I can easily and significantly increase its
credit risk, without increasing its regulatory capital.
Second, the advanced approaches of Basel II are designed to substantially reduce
the perverse incentive effects and opportunities for regulatory capital arbitrage
present in Basel I. Basel II significantly increases the risk sensitivity of the capital
rule. Under the advanced approaches, capital requirements for an exposure will
vary on the basis of a bank's actual risk experience. If a bank increases the credit
risk of its portfolio, its regulatory capital requirements will also increase and vice
versa. The enhanced risk sensitivity of Basel II will thus ensure that banks have
positive incentives for lending to more creditworthy counterparties, for lending
on a collateralized basis, for increasing loan seniorities and for holding a larger
capital cushion for higher-risk exposures. Basel II also includes sophisticated
methods to address capital markets transactions.
Third, the Basel II regulatory capital framework has three pillars--minimum
capital requirements, supervisory review of capital adequacy, and market
discipline through disclosure--that build on the economic capital and other riskmanagement approaches of sophisticated banks and competing institutions. As a
result, Basel II will be better able than the current system to adapt over time to
innovations in banking and financial markets. The new framework should also
establish a more coherent relationship between regulatory measures of capital
adequacy and the day-to-day risk management conducted by banks.
Additionally, I would argue that one of the key benefits of the Basel II process is
that it has prompted banks to make substantial progress in developing much more
sophisticated risk-measurement and -management processes. For example, most
international banks have adopted detailed rating systems for credit risk that assess
both bon-ower and facility characteristics. That is, the banks assign one rating that
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reflects a borrower's overall creditworthiness and another for each individual
exposure that takes into account collateral, seniority and other factors that affect
how much a bank is likely to lose on that specific exposure if the borrower
defaults. In addition, large banks are increasingly using common credit-risk
measurement concepts, such as probability of default (PD), loss given default
(LGD) and exposure at default (EAD). Together, these concepts help banks take a
more granular approach to assessing the various drivers of credit risk, which in
tum helps them to make more informed decisions about extending credit,
mitigating risk and determining capital needs. Another example of industry
progress is in the measurement and management of operational risk. Under Basel
II, banks are expected to weigh both quantitative and qualitative factors in order to
assess potential future operational losses. As a result, Basel II has already helped
the industry improve its methods for identifying and measuring risks--and for
estimating the capital needed to support those risks.

11.2 Key Elements of Basel II
The Basel II framework is not a 'one-size-fits-all' standard and offers a variety of
options. The new capital adequacy framework has been crafted following a
lengthy and inclusive consultation process, and offers several approaches of
varying degrees of sophistication aimed at being applicable to diverse banking
and supervisory systems.
Basel II consists ofthree "pillars:"
•

Pillar 1 revises the 1988 Accord's guidelines by aligning the minimum
capital requirements more closely to each bank's actual risk of economic
loss. It requires higher levels of capital for those borrowers estimated to
present higher levels of credit risk and vice versa. Pillar 1 provides four
basic variants for determining capital adequacy requirements for banks:
a) the "simple standardized approach," broadly based on the Basel I Accord
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of1988;
the "standardized approach," using external credit ratings as a basis for
setting capital adequacy charges for various asset classes;
the "foundation internal ratings-based approach;" or

d) the "advanced internal ratings-based approach."
•

The latter two methodologies are based on probability of default and othe
components of credit risk derived from banks' own internal risk analysis
systems. Pillar 1 also establishes an explicit capital charge for a bank's
operational risk.

•

Pillar 2 reinforces and expands many of the principles in the Basel Core
Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (BCP) and recognizes the
necessity of supervisors reviewing banks' internal assessments of their
overall risks and capital needs. Supervisors will evaluate the activities and
risk profiles of banks to determine whether the banks should hold higher
levels of capital than what is specified under Pillar 1. In addition, it
suggests how banks could deal with risks not covered in Pillar 1, e.g.,
concentration risk and interest rate risk in the banking book.
Pillar 3 enhances the degree of transparency in bank's public reporting with
the expectation that this will provide a basis for more informed analysis by
markets and customers on banks' financial condition and risk management.
Such information will encourage market discipline which, in turn, will
support the efforts of bank supervisors to encourage prudent management
by banks.

•

11.3 Benefits
Basel II is an important step forward in an evolving process toward improved
banking supervision in countries. It encourages increased attention to operational
risk and risk management practices in financial institutions and supervisory
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agencies as well as improved disclosure and market discipline.
Basel II attempts to incorporate many aspects of these advances m risk
management and has thus raised the bar for banking supervision in countries. In
particular, it:
•

provides a more risk-sensitive approach to capital adequacy;

•

underlines banks' own responsibility for ensuring they maintain sufficient
capital;

•

provides guidance for better supervisory practices;

•

provides a stronger basis for the role markets can play in identifying and
discouraging excessive risk-taking by banks.

•

enable the alignment of capital requirements more closely with the risks
actually assumed by banks

•

continuously prompt banks to adopt the best-available risk management
practices

TTI.O Implications of Basel II and the Role oflnternational Financial
Institutions

m.t

Implications

•

Pressure to implement Basel II. Some countries report pressure from their
major banks and from the market to adopt Basel II promptly. As Basel II is
viewed by many as the new global capital standard, it may be difficult for
countries to explain to market analysts why they are not immediately
moving to implement it. Hurried implementation, however, may lead to
weaker rather than stronger supervision. The more sophisticated variants
of Pillar I require data, skills and systems that are lacking in many
developing countries; applying models with parameters that are borrowed
from other countries could provide a misleading indication of required
capital. Therefore, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS)
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has emphasized that Basel II "may not be a first priority for all non-G 10
supervisory authorities in terms of what is needed to strengthen their
banking supervision, and should adopt Basel II only in a timeframe
consistent with national priorities and capacities.
•

A strong supervisory foundation should be a precondition for Basel II
implementation. The IMF's "Gaps Paper" reports weak compliance with
many of the BCPs across countries that are important to the effective
implementation of Basel II. A solid infrastructure for financial services
needs to be in place before a country embarks on implementing Basel II.
Banking, as well as banking supervision, can only function properly in an
environment of good accounting and auditing rules and practices, a
functioning legal framework for financial transactions and banking
supervision, including reliable financial information, contract
enforcement, loan performance data, data sharing, market transactions
disclosure and collateral execution. BCPs with which compliance is often
weak include standards on adequate supervisory resources, capital
adequacy regimes, loan evaluation and provisioning, internal controls,
consolidated supervision, and cross-border supervision.

•

Higher capital requirements likely for loans to emerging markets. For
many emerging and developing countries, the increased risk sensitivity in
Basel II may lead to higher bank capital requirements for loans to these
countries. The BCBS' Third Quantitative Impact Study showed that banks
lending to emerging and developing markets will face higher capital
charges for credit risk and operational risk. This could result in higher
borrowing costs as well as reduced capital flows to higher risk countries.
The effect of Basel II on banks' lending rates, however, is not
straightfotward. Banks lending to emerging markets may already
incorporate the higher risk in their current lending rates. Moreover, many
other factors besides the cost of capital determine bank lending rates,
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including competitive pressures and strategic considerations. Even if
bank-intermediated flows to emerging markets declined, nonbank flows
might well offset some or all ofthe decline.
•

Portfolio adjustments arising from Basel II. The application of different
capital charges based on the credit risk of a type of loan (e.g., residential
mortgage loans) or borrower may lead banks to change the composition of
their asset portfolios. Banks may tend to increase their holding oflow risk
assets (with lower capital charges) and may reduce their holdings of those
assets, which under Basel II, generate a higher capital charge and put
upward pressure on lending rates. These factors could shift the flow of
credit from higher risk sectors ( e.g., commercial real estate), to less risky
sectors (e.g., residential housing). More work needs to be done to assess
the likelihood of the occurrence of such portfolio shifts and their potential
macroeconomic consequences.

•

Increased procyclicality. In addition to higher provisions against
corporate loans, triggered by deteriorating corporate performance, Basel
II may require banks to assign higher risk weights in an economic
downturn. This raises banks' cost of extending credit, which may in turn
have the effect of further restricting bank lending. While this is arguably
an inherent part of a risk-based capital regime, and can lead to more
accurate pricing of risk, it may also have the effect of exacerbating
business cycles. A more risk-sensitive and forward-looking capital
framework may, on the other hand, also provide incentives for banks to
better analyze risk and avoid excessive "herd" behavior.

•

Risk of selective implementation of Basel II. Basel II offers a large
number of options, starting with legitimate choices between the simpler
and the more advanced approaches to capital adequacy. However, some
countries may wish to exercise national discretion to adopt lower risk
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weights for certain asset categories permitted under Basel II, without
meeting the Basel II requirements of a safe lending environment and
without taking into account the loss experience of their countries. Such
practices, such as application of lower risk weights for residential
mortgages, retail and SME lending should not be authorized by
supervisors unless countries have the historical loss data and appropriate
legal judicial and accounting environment to justify these lower risk
weights. To do otherwise could lead to unwarranted reductions in bank
capital and increased systemic vulnerability.
•

Incentives to develop credit rating agencies. Basel II may create an
incentive for countries to facilitate the development of credit rating
agencies and foster an improved credit culture. For instance,
implementation of the Standardized Approach under Pillar I allows the
use of borrower ratings issued by rating agencies to determine asset risk
weights. This is only feasible, however, in countries with sufficient rating
agency penetration. If rating agency penetration is low and ratings are not
available for major borrowers, then the standard risk weights of Basel I
will be applied. For ratings to qualify for use under Basel II, supervisors
are expected to assess the quality of the rating agencies, based on criteria
of objectivity, independence, availability to foreign and domestic
institutions, disclosure of methodologies, adequacy of resources and
credibility. Such evaluations will require additional resources and
expertise.

•

Increased resource pressures to build financial infrastructures.
Supervisors and banks wishing to implement Basel TT and, particularly,
the IRB approaches, may need to build considerable additional
infrastructure, i.e., data and reporting systems, and verification and
validation capacity. The advanced approaches to measuring credit risk
require a minimum of reliable five-year data sets on credit performance,
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according to the Basel Committee. Other experts argue that five years is
insufficient to obtain an accurate estimation of risk; if the time series of
data available is less than that of a typical business cycle, then the models
will exacerbate cyclical swings more than an approach that looks at risk
over the entire cycle. Such data sets are currently only partially available
in many countries. Where neither banks nor supervisors have developed
their own databases, credit registries or data pooling arrangements can be
used.
•

Shortage of trained supervisors. To build their supervisory capacity,
countries will need to recruit additional specialized staff and provide
extensive training to existing staff on Basel II. The FSI Survey on
Implementation of the new capital adequacy framework estimates that
responding countries could require training of over 9,000 supervisors.
Demand for expertise in risk-based supervision, credit and operational
risk management is likely to increase significantly in the next few years.
In most countries, supervisory agencies, operating under government pay
scales, will be disadvantaged in competing against the private sector for
these skills. The prospect of a "brain drain" of Basel II-trained supervisors
to the private sector is very real, further challenging the ability of
supervisory agencies to build the necessary capacity to implement Basel
II.

•

The role of the host supervisor. For foreign banks operating under the
more advanced versions of Basel II, host supervisors are responsible for
deciding to what extent they wish to rely on home country supervisors to
validate the systems and policies of the parent banks' major foreign
subsidiaries. For instance, if a home supervisor authorizes one of its large
international banks to operate under advanced-IRB, it will expect the bank
to operate all of its major subsidiaries, both domestic and foreign, under
Advanced-IRB. Such arrangements could raise a number of home-host
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issues. For instance, is it feasible for the supervisors in every country in
which that bank has major subsidiaries to require each subsidiary to go
through an approval/validation process? Alternatively, should the host
supervisor of a foreign bank subsidiary rely, in essence, on the home
supervisor to judge the adequacy of that subsidiary's capital adequacy? In
the event that the foreign subsidiary encountered capital problems, what
would be the accountability of the home supervisor to the host authorities
and legislature? These are difficult questions that are being discussed
between a number of home and host regulators, and the banks operating in
their jurisdictions. Ultimately, the host supervisory agency has the
responsibility for maintaining a safe and sound banking system in its
country and can be expected to retain the authority to impose the "rules of
the house" upon foreign banks' local subsidiaries. Host supervisors will in
any case need to develop resources to dialogue effectively with home
supervisors on Basel II implementation and, will in this context, where
applicable, also need to be able to assess the quality of implementation of
more advanced Basel II systems in the host country.
•

Home-host supervisory cooperation. Effective working relationships,
including agreements on information sharing, need to be formed between
home and host authorities. The challenge will be to strike an appropriate
balance between efficient home country consolidated supervision, host
country responsibility and avoidance of duplicative and overlapping
regulation/supervision of foreign banks. These agreements should take
account of the differences between home and host supervisory systems
and capabilities and between the capital frameworks used by foreign
banks and domestic banks. The Accord Implementation Group (or AIG, a
subgroup of the BCBS), bas developed guidance for the development of
mechanisms for home-host cooperation, and is compiling materials on
current arrangements between home and host regulators ("case studies").
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In countries where foreign banks control a substantial portion of the
banking assets, the national authorities will need to work very closely with
the foreign banks' home supervisors to develop an effective supervisory
process and will need staffwith sufficient expertise to be able to conduct a
meaningful dialogue with the home supervisors of these foreign banks. In
the EU, renewed efforts are underway to address issues of home-host
supervisory cooperation, in the form of multilateral arrangements with
regard to conglomerate supervision and crisis management, to
supplement an extensive system of bilateral MOUs among EU
supervisory authorities.
•

Commercial bank implementation. Basel II has reinforced the need for
commercial banks to focus more on risk management and to better align
capital and risk. Large internationally-active banks in developed countries
have already begun to take steps to implement Basel II according to the
Basel timetable. Medium-income countries have adopted a variety of
approaches depending on the degree of sophistication of their banks and
resources available to the supervisory authorities. Banks in lower-income
countries are the most challenged by the implementation of the advanced
approaches under Pillar 1, as are their supervisors.

•

Integrated supervisory framework. This is necessary to enhance the
ability to react quickly, effectively and more transparently to any adverse
shocks that might impact the financial sector. This will contribute to
ensuring continued confidence and ultimately to improving the stability
of the financial system. Looking at the main areas in which efforts are now
focused, there are important common elements including gradual and
prudent transition to the new regulatory framework for capital adequacy,
efficient and effective implementation of the new supervisory tools, also
by means of quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of supervisory
functions, and closer cross-sector and cross-border co-operation and
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collaboration to enhance synergy in regulatory compliance. Globally, the
financial structure has seen a remarkable transformation and elements
such as the provision of risk capital and the strengthening of market-based
elements have become more important in recent years. The clearest
transformation of the financial sector has been the tendency towards
integration, which is leading to positive scale and scope effects and to
increased competitive pressures on financial intermediaries. This is
eliminating quasi-rents, improving the allocation of capital and offering
the highest possible returns and the lowest possible cost of capital.
Moreover, enhanced competition among intermediaries has provided
greater scope for financial innovation.

111.2

Role Oflnternational Financial Institutions

m.2.1 Capacity Building
A large majority of countries can be expected to implement one of the variants of
Basel II over time. To meet the demand for technical assistance to countries
implementing Basel II and to be able to conduct surveillance of financial sectors
under the changing environment, If Os will need to build expertise on the various
aspects of risk-based supervisory frameworks within their own organizations in
order to provide capacity building and institutional strengthening for home
country banks.

ID.2.2

Surveillance

TFOs have an interest in safe, balanced and carefully sequenced implementation
of Basel II. Countries should be advised to avoid overly ambitious schedules and
the diversion of resources away from core supervisory and regulatory functions.
In the meantime, candid assessments will need to be made of country readiness,
including sufficient implementation of the BCP and the feasibility and
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comprehensiveness of roadmaps to Basel II. For countries that are implementing
Basel II, preparing assessments of their supervisory and regulatory systems will
become more complex. There will be a need to assess the quality of
implementation and the capacity to effectively exercise Basel II-based
supervision. A surveillance and assessment methodology and supporting
guidance materials, will need to be developed based on the text of the Basel II
framework, to serve as a basis for an assessment of whether supervisors are
monitoring effectively the quality of Basel II implementation by banks.
Furthermore, comparability of assessments, while not the primary objective of
assessments will become more difficult, as countries exercise a wide variety of
implementation options.
As banks implement Basel II and the risk weights are adjusted as a result of the
new capital framework, the reported capital position of individual banks will
change. These changes to a bank's reported capital ratios may occur even when
the banks' portfolio and risk profile remain unchanged. In addition, Basel Il
provides countries with more than 40 options of national discretion, leading to
variations in the actual frameworks among countries. As a result of such
variations, assessments and comparisons of banking systems' capital positions
over time will become very difficult.
For those countries with banks adopting the internal ratings-based approaches,
judging the quality and effectiveness of the supervision of these banks will
require assessors with a good understanding of underlying implications of
implementation of Basel II, in particular the key aspects of risk management.
Furthermore, in order to exercise adequate quality control, IFO staff will need a
sufficient level of knowledge on Basel II and its implementation aspects. For the
reason that banks adopting the internal ratings approach are likely to be
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systemically important on a national if not global basis, it will be very important
that the surveillance of these countries include a comprehensive review of the
adequacy of Basel II implementation by the supervisory authorities.

m.2.3

TechnicalAssistance

Providing technical assistance related to improving supervisory capacity is an
appropriate role for IFOs in the long-term development of banking sectors and
banking supervision in countries. A distinction can be made between, on the one
hand, "pre-Basel II" assistance to help build the necessary basis without which
implementation of Basel II should not be undertaken (i.e., BCP compliance and
risk-based supervision) and, on the other hand, actual Basel II implementation.
They can help countries improve the quality of their banking supervision and
establish the preconditions for effective banking supervision.
With regard to "pre-Basel 11" technical assistance in strengthening supervisory
systems, IFOs in accordance with their areas of expertise and availability of
resourceswill continue to collaborate closely in supporting countries in the
following areas:
(i)

improving supervision consistent with the BCP, Basel I and risk-based
superv1s1on;

(ii)

training ofsupervisory staff

(iii) strengthening banking system infrastructure and legal framework;
(iv)

payment systems; and

(v)

advising on insolvency frameworks.

Countries are likely to request assistance in Basel II-related areas on the

following topics: (i) developing a roadmap for Basel II implementation; (ii)
cost/benefit analyses of Basel II i;111plementation; (iii) developing supervisory
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skills to assess the quality of banks' risk management models; (iv) development
and analysis of data sets to analyze historical loss information; (v) development
of disclosure-related requirements; and (vi) qualification of external rating
agencies.
IV.O. Recommendations
IFOs should focus on strengthening financial sector infrastructure, core
supervisory functions in line with the BCP and including risk-based supervision,
as well as conditions allowing for the exercise of market discipline. These are
essential prerequisites for countries seeking to adopt the Basel II framework.
IFOs will provide assistance to host countries wishing to strengthen their
supervision but should, at the same time, take a neutral position with regard to the
question of whether host supervisors should permit foreign banks in their
countries to operate under Basel II (particularly the advanced approaches), while
domestic banks remain under Basel I. Host supervisors, however, should retain
responsibility for the supervision ofall banks operating under their jurisdiction.
Implementation of Basel II in Nigeria is, therefore, necessary in order to ensure
the safe and sound operation of our banking industry and the stability of our
financial system. Basel II would promote continued improvements in bank risk
management practices and would maintain capital levels in the banking system
that is appropriate and risk-sensitive. As you all know, the existing Basel I capital
regime bas very limited risk sensitivity and is widely known to be outdated for
large, complex banking organizations. Ifwe retain Basel I for these institutions,
we will be leaving in place a regulatory capital regime that could undermine the
safety and soundness of our largest banking organizations by widening the gap
between these banks' regulatory capital requirements and their actual risk
profiles.
The role of the Central Bank of Nigeria reinforces our belief in the importance of
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maintaining prudent and risk-sensitive capital requirements for financial
institutions. Beyond its supervisory authority over individual banking
organizations, the CBN is responsible for maintaining stable financial markets
and ensuring a strong financial system. In this regard, the CBN has long required
banking organizations to operate in a safe and sound manner, and to hold sufficient
capital to protect against potential losses. Financial stability is enhanced when
banks' regulatory capital measures adequately reflect risk as well as when banks
continually improve their risk-management practices. Since the Basel II regime is
far superior to the current Basel regime in aligning regulatory capital measures
with risk and fostering continual improvements in risk management for our largest
and most complex banking organizations, I believe it will contribute to a more
resilient financial system.

While much ofthe debate on Basel II has centered on the complexity and resource
requirements of the advanced capital approaches in Pillar 1 of the Framework,
countries may benefit more, in the medium term, from implementation of Pillars
2 and 3. Implementation of the more sophisticated Pillar I capital adequacy
methodologies may be too resource intensive and unnecessary for many
countries, given the current level of development of their banking systems.
Premature adoption of Basel II in countries with limited capacity could
inappropriately divert resources from more urgent priorities. This may ultimately
weaken rather than strengthen supervision in these countries. Focusing on
building supervisory capacity may avoid many ofthese risks.
However, none of these alternatives presents either a substantive approach or a
mode of international cooperation preferable to Basel II, at least not at present. But
elements of several of these alternatives may be planted firmly onto the modified
Basel II. However, five recommendations with respect to capital regulation
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becomes necessary:

•

Accelerate work on redefining capital The Basel Committee has long

recognized the need to revisit the definition of capital. Although the
committee decided not to address this topic in Basel II, it has included the
definition of capital as part of its post- Basel II work program. Thus, this
first recommendation is endorsement of the committee's agenda, rather
than a call for a change of course. However, the rather deliberate pace with
which the committee has begun this review should be accelerated. The
fallout from the subprime crisis has again underscored the importance of
ensuring that regulatory capital truly possesses the stable buffering
characteristics that should define core capital.
• Adopt a simple leverage ratio requirement. This admittedly blunt
measure of capital is highly transparent and not subject to easy evasion. It
provides a kind of regulatory safety net, even though it is not highly risk
sensitive. The committee should also consider implementing a minimum
ratio of capital to income in order to take account of off-balance-sheet bank
activities in a similarly blunt but transparent fashion.
• Institute a requirement that complex, internationally-active banks

issue subordinated debt with specific, harmonized characteristics.
While not an assured outcome, there is a reasonable chance that the market
pricing of this debt would serve a "canary in a coal mine" role in alerting
supervisors to potential problems at a bank.

•

Remove the detailed rules of pillar 1 (minimum capital rules) in favor
of augmenting the current pillar 2 principles, which guide national
agencies' supervision of complex, internationally-active financial
institutions. These principles would include (1) some form of risk-based
capital requirement, (2) a requirement that banks maintain a credit risk
model for use in calculating internal capital requirements and an
operational risk system, and (3) more detailed expectations for supervisory
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intervention when capital requirements fall below minimum levels.
National implementation of these principles would be subject to regular
and sophisticated peer review. While less detail is needed on the minimum
capital rules, more detail would be needed on the information that banks
adopting the internal ratingsbased approach would have to disclose.
• Strengthen the monitoring role of the Basel Committee. This should
include regular and substantially more robust peer review of national
regulatory activity to implement Basel rules and principles. The
committee should regularly report on bank capital positions and capital
superv1s1on.
Finally, and most importantly, the committee should establish a special inspection
unita supranational team of experts that conducts in-bank validations of the credit
risk models used by internationally-active banks in the Basel Committee
countries. This unit would serve both to disseminate expertise among the various
national supervisors and to provide some monitoring of their own validation of
their banks' models and attendant risk management.

Conclusion
The three pillars of Basel II provide a broad and coherent framework for linking
regulatory capital to risk, for improving internal risk measurement and
management and for enhancing supervisory and market discipline at large,
complex and internationally-active banks. Indeed, we have already seen
significant progress in risk measurement and management at many banks in the
United States and elsewhere as a result of the Basel II development process. It is
also important to modernize the Basel I framework to improve the risk sensitivity
of capital requirements at smaller and less complex banks, without artificially
creating competitive inequalities.
The CBN should continue to support efforts to implement the Basel II framework.
It is critical to move forward expeditiously with Basel II implementation so that
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our largest and internationally active banking organizations maintain their safety
and soundness and remain competitive, our supervisors bolster their assessment
capabilities and the market gains greater access to information about risk.

In closing, Basel II offers a promising new mode of international economic
cooperation. The Basel Committee's work in general and Basel II, in particular, is
an example of a system of structured international activities intended to make
national laws and regulations more congruent or effective, implemented by
national government officials with domestic regulatory responsibility.
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